We compare the sample complexity of private learning [Kasiviswanathan et al. 2008] and sanitization [Blum et al. 2008] under pure ǫ-differential privacy [Dwork et al. TCC 2006] and approximate (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [Dwork et al. Eurocrypt 2006]. We show that the sample complexity of these tasks under approximate differential privacy can be significantly lower than that under pure differential privacy.
Introduction
Learning is often applied to collections of sensitive data of individuals and it is important to protect the privacy of these individuals. We examine the sample complexity of private learning [22] and a related tasksanitization [7] -while preserving differential privacy [13] . We show striking differences between the required sample complexity for these tasks under ǫ-differential privacy [13] (also called pure differential privacy) and its variant (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [11] (also called approximate differential privacy).
Differential privacy. Differential privacy protects the privacy of individuals by requiring that the information of an individual does not significantly affect the output. More formally, an algorithm A satisfies the requirement of Pure Differential Privacy if for every two databases that differ on exactly one entry, and for every event defined over the output set of A, the probability of this event is close up to a multiplicative factor of e ǫ ≈ 1 + ǫ whether A is applied on one database or on the other. Approximate Differential Privacy is a relaxation of pure differential privacy where the above guarantee needs to be satisfied only for events whose probability is at least ≈ δ. We show that even negligible δ > 0 can have a significant effect on sample complexity of private learning and sanitization.
Private Learning. Private learning was introduced in [22] as a combination of Valiant's PAC learning model [29] and differential privacy. For now, we can think of a private learner as a differentially private algorithm that operates on a set of classified random examples, and outputs a hypothesis that misclassifies fresh examples with probability at most (say) 1 10 . The work on private learning has mainly focused on pure privacy. On the one hand, Blum et al. [6] and Kasiviswanathan et al. [22] have showed, via generic constructions, that every finite concept class C can be learned privately, using sample complexity proportional to poly(log |C|) (often efficiently). On the other hand, a significant difference was shown between the sample complexity of traditional (non-private) learners (crystallized in terms of VC(C) and smaller than log |C| in many interesting cases) and private learners. As an example, let POINT d be the class of point functions over the domain {0, 1}
d (these are the functions that evaluate to one on exactly one point of the domain and to zero elsewhere). Consider the task of properly learning POINT d where, after consulting its sample, the learner outputs a hypothesis that is by itself in POINT d . Non-privately, learning POINT d requires merely a constant number of examples (as VC(POINT d ) = 1). Privately, Ω(d) examples are required [3] . Curiously, the picture changes when the private learner is allowed to output a hypothesis not in POINT d (such learners are called improper), as the sample complexity can be reduced to O(1) [3] . This, however, comes with a price, as it was shown in [3] that such learners must return hypotheses that evaluate to one on exponentially many points in {0, 1} d and, hence, are very far from all functions in POINT d . A complete characterization for the sample complexity of pure-private learners was recently given in [4] , in terms of a new dimension -the Representation Dimension, that is, given a class C, the number of samples needed and sufficient for privately learning C is Θ(RepDim(C)). Following that, Feldman and Xiao [17] showed an equivalence between the representation dimension of a concept C and the randomized one-way communication complexity of the evaluation problem for concepts from C. Using this equivalence they separated the sample complexity of pure-private learners from that of non-private ones. For example, they showed a lower bound of Ω(d) on the sample complexity of every pure-private (proper or improper) learner for the class THRESH d of threshold functions over the interval [0, 2 d − 1]. This is a strong separation from the non-private sample complexity, which is O(1) (as the VC dimension of this class is constant).
We show that the sample complexity of proper learning with approximate differential privacy can be significantly lower than that satisfying pure differential privacy. Our starting point for this work is an observation that with approximate (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, sample complexity of O(log(1/δ)) suffices for learning points properly. This gives a separation between pure and approximate proper private learning for δ = 2 −o(d) .
Sanitization. The notion of differentially private sanitization was introduced in the work of Blum et al. [7] . A sanitizer for a class of predicates C is a differentially private mechanism translating an input database S to an output databaseŜ such thatŜ (approximately) agrees with S on the fraction of the entries satisfying ϕ for all ϕ ∈ C, where every predicate ϕ ∈ C is a function from X to {0, 1}. Blum et al. gave a generic construction of pure differentially private sanitizers exhibiting sample complexity O(VC(C) log |X|). Lower bounds partially supporting this sample complexity were given by [25, 3, 21] . As with private learning, we show significant differences between the sample complexity required for sanitization of simple predicate classes under pure and approximate differential privacy. We note that the construction of sanitizers is not generally computationally feasible [14, 28, 27] .
Our Contributions
To simplify the exposition, we omit in this section dependency on all variables except for d, corresponding to the representation length of domain elements.
Tools. A recent instantiation of the Propose-Test-Release (PTR) framework [12] by Smith and Thakurta [26] results, almost immediately, with a proper learner for points, exhibiting O(1) sample complexity while preserving approximate differential privacy. This simple technique does not suffice for our other constructions of learners and sanitizers, and we, hence, introduce new tools for coping with proper private learning of thresholds and axis-aligned rectangles, and sanitization for point functions and thresholds:
• Choosing mechanism: Given a low-sensitivity quality function, one can use the exponential mechanism [24] to choose an approximately maximizing solution. This requires, in general, a database of size logarithmic in the number of possible solutions. We identify a sub family of low-sensitivity functions, called bounded-growth functions, for which it is possible to significantly reduce the necessary database size when using the exponential mechanism.
• Recursive algorithm for quasi-concave promise problems: We define a family of optimization problems, which we call Quasi-Concave Promise Problems. The possible solutions are ordered, and quasi-concavity means that if two solutions f ≤ h have quality of at least X , then any solution f ≤ g ≤ h also has quality of at least X . The optimization goal is, when there exists a solution with a promised quality of (at least) r, to find a solution with quality ≈ r. We observe that a quasi-concave promise problem can be privately approximated using a solution to a smaller instance of a quasi-concave promise problem. This allows us to construct an efficient recursive algorithm solving such problems privately. We show that the task of learning THRESH d is, in fact, a quasi-concave promise problem, and it can be privately solved using our algorithm with sample size roughly 2 O(log * d) . Sanitization for THRESH d does not exactly fit the model of quasi-concave promise problems but can still be solved by iteratively defining and solving a small number of quasi-concave promise problems.
Implications for Private Learning and Sanitization. We give new private proper-learning algorithms for the classes POINT d and THRESH d . We also construct a new private proper-learner for (a discrete version of) the class of all axis-aligned rectangles over n dimensions. Our algorithms exhibit sample complexity that is significantly lower than bounds given in prior work, separating pure and approximate private learning. Similarly, we construct sanitizers for POINT d and THRESH d , again with sample complexity that is significantly lower than bounds given in prior work, separating sanitization in the pure and approximate privacy cases. Our algorithms are time-efficient. Sanitization vs. Private Learning. Gupta et al. [18] have given reductions in both directions between agnostic learning of a concept class C, and the sanitization task for the same class C. The learners and sanitizers they consider are limited to access their data via statistical queries [23] (such algorithm can be easily transformed to satisfy differential privacy [6] ). In Section 5 we show a similar reduction from the task of privately learning a concept class C to the sanitization task of C, where the sanitizer's access to the database is unrestricted. This allows us to exploit lower bounds on the sample complexity of private learners and show an explicit class of predicates C over a domain X for which every private sanitizer requires databases of size Ω(VC(C) log |X|). A similar lower bound was shown by Hardt and Rothblum [21] , achieving tighter results in terms of the approximation parameter. Their work proves the existence of such a concept class, but does not give an explicit one.
Label Privacy. In Section 6 we examine private learning under a relaxation of differential privacy called label privacy (see [9] and references therein), where the learner is required to only protect the privacy of the labels in the sample. Chaudhuri et al. [9] have proved lower bounds for label-private learners in terms of the doubling dimension of the target concept class. We show that the VC dimension completely characterizes the sample complexity of such learners, that is, the sample complexity of learning with label privacy is equal (up to constants) to learning without privacy.
Open Questions
This work raises two kinds of research directions. First, this work presents (time and sample efficient) private learners and sanitizers for relatively simple concept classes. It would be natural to try and construct private learners and sanitizers for more complex concept classes. In particular, constructing a (time and sample efficient) private learner for hyperplanes would be very interesting to the community.
Another very interesting research direction is to try and understand the sample complexity of approximateprivate learners. Currently, no lower bounds are known on the sample complexity of such learners. On the other hand, no generic construction for such learners is known to improve the sample complexity achieved by the generic construction of Kasiviswanathan et al. [22] for pure-private learners. Characterizing the sample complexity of approximate-private learners is a very interesting open question.
Other Related Work
Most related to our work is the work on private learning and its sample complexity [22, 6, 3, 9] and the early work on sanitization [7] mentioned above. Another related work is the work of De [10] , who proved a separation between pure ǫ-differential privacy and approximate (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Specifically, he demonstrated that there exists a query where it is sufficient to add noise O( n log(1/δ)) when δ > 0 and Ω(n) noise is required when δ = 0. Earlier work by Hardt and Talwar [20] separated pure from approximate differential privacy for δ = n −O(1) . Another interesting gap between pure and approximate differential privacy is the following. Blum et al. [7] have given a generic construction of pure-private sanitizers, in which the sample complexity grows as 1 α 3 (where α is the approximation parameter). Following that, Hardt and Rothblum [19] showed that with approximate-privacy, the sample complexity can be reduce to grow as 1 α 2 . Currently, it is unknown whether this gap is essential.
Preliminaries
Notations. We use O γ (f (t)) as a shorthand for O(h(γ)·f (t)) for some non-negative function h. In informal discussions, we sometimes use O(f (t)) instead of O(f (t) · polylog(f (t))). For example, 2
We use X to denote an arbitrary domain, and X d for the domain {0, 1} d . We use X m (and respectively X m d ) for the cartesian m th power of X, i.e., X m = (X) m , and use
Pr x∼D [x = j] for j ∈ X, and D(J) Pr x∼D [x ∈ J] for J ⊆ X.
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy aims at protecting information of individuals. We consider a database, where each entry contains information pertaining to an individual. An algorithm operating on databases is said to preserve differential privacy if a change of a single record of the database does not significantly change the output distribution of the algorithm. Intuitively, this means that whatever is learned about an individual could also be learned with her data arbitrarily modified (or without her data). Formally: Definition 2.1. Databases S 1 ∈ X m and S 2 ∈ X m over a domain X are called neighboring if they differ in exactly one entry. Definition 2.2 (Differential Privacy [13, 11] ). A randomized algorithm A is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private if for all neighboring databases S 1 , S 2 ∈ X m , and for all sets F of outputs,
The probability is taken over the random coins of A. When δ = 0 we omit it and say that A preserves ǫ-differential privacy.
We use the term pure differential privacy when δ = 0 and the term approximate differential privacy when δ > 0, in which case δ is typically a negligible function of the database size m.
We will later present algorithms that access their input database using (several) differentially private mechanisms. We will use the following composition theorems.
Theorem 2.3 ([11]
). If A 1 and A 2 satisfy (ǫ 1 , δ 1 ) and (ǫ 2 , δ 2 ) differential privacy, respectively, then their concatenation
Moreover, a similar theorem holds for the adaptive case, where a mechanism interacts with k adaptively chosen differentially private mechanisms.
Theorem 2.4 ([11, 12]).
A mechanism that permits k adaptive interactions with mechanisms that preserves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy (and does not access the database otherwise) ensures (kǫ, kδ)-differential privacy.
Note that the privacy guaranties of the above bound deteriorates linearly with the number of interactions. By bounding the expected privacy loss in each interaction (as opposed to worst-case), Dwork et al. [15] showed the following stronger composition theorem, where privacy deteriorates (roughly) as √ kǫ + kǫ 2 (rather than kǫ). 
Preliminaries from Learning Theory

The PAC Model
A concept c : X → {0, 1} is a predicate that labels examples taken from the domain X by either 0 or 1. A concept class C over X is a set of concepts (predicates) mapping X to {0, 1}. A learning algorithm is given examples sampled according to an unknown probability distribution D over X, and labeled according to an unknown target concept c ∈ C. The learning algorithm is successful when it outputs a hypothesis h that approximates the target concept over samples from D. More formally:
Definition 2.6. The generalization error of a hypothesis h : X → {0, 1} is defined as
If error D (c, h) ≤ α we say that h is α-good for c and D.
Definition 2.7 (PAC Learning [29] ). Algorithm A is an (α, β, m)-PAC learner for a concept class C over X using hypothesis class H if for all concepts c ∈ C, all distributions D on X, given an input of m samples S = (z 1 , . . . , z m ), where
The probability is taken over the random choice of the examples in S according to D and the coin tosses of the learner A. If H ⊆ C then A is called a proper PAC learner; otherwise, it is called an improper PAC learner.
, the empirical error of h is
The Vapnik-Chervonenkis Dimension
The Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) Dimension is a combinatorial measure of concept classes, which characterizes the sample size of PAC learners.
Definition 2.9 ([30]
). Let C be a concept class over a domain X, and let B = {b 1 , . . . , b ℓ } ⊆ X. The set of all dichotomies (behaviors) on B that are realized by C is
Observe that Π C (B) is a subset of {0, 1} ℓ (as c ∈ C maps into {0, 1}). The set of dichotomies Π C (B) can be viewed as the "projection" of C on B.
ℓ (where ℓ = |B|).
That is, B is shattered by C if C realizes all possible dichotomies over B.
Definition 2.11 (VC-Dimension [30] ). The VC-Dimension of a concept class C (over a domain X), denoted as VC(C), is the cardinality of the largest set B ⊆ X shattered by C. If arbitrarily large finite sets can be shattered by C, then VC(C) = ∞.
Observe that as Π C (B) ≤ |C| a set B can be shattered only if |B| ≤ log |C| and hence VC(C) ≤ log |C|.
VC Bounds
Classical results in computational learning theory state that a sample of size θ(VC(C)) is both necessary and sufficient for the PAC learning of a concept class C. The following two theorems give upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity.
Theorem 2.12 ([16]
). Any algorithm for PAC learning a concept class C must have sample complexity Ω(
, where α is the approximation parameter. Theorem 2.13 (VC-Dimension Generalization Bound [30, 8] ). Let C and D be a concept class and a distribution over a domain X. Let α, β > 0, and m ≥ 
So, for any concept class C, any algorithm that takes a sample of m = Ω α,β (VC(C)) labeled examples and produces as output a concept h ∈ C that agrees with the sample is a PAC learner for C. Such an algorithm is a PAC learner for C using C (that is, both the target concept and the returned hypotheses are taken from the same concept class C), and, therefore, there always exist a hypothesis h ∈ C with error S (h) = 0 (e.g., the target concept itself).
The next theorem handles (in particular) the agnostic case, in which a learning algorithm for a concept class C is using a hypotheses class H = C, and given a sample S (labeled by some c ∈ C), a hypothesis h with error S (h) = 0 might not exist in H. Theorem 2.14 (VC-Dimension Agnostic Generalization Bound [2, 1]). Let D and H be a distribution and a concept class over a domain X, and let f : X → {0, 1} be some concept, not necessarily in H. For a sample S = (
Notice that in the agnostic case the sample complexity is proportional to 1 α 2 , as opposed to 1 α when learning a class C using C.
Private Learning
In private learning, we would like to accomplish the same goal as in non-private learning, while protecting the privacy of the input database.
Definition 2.15 (Private PAC Learning [22] ). Let A be an algorithm that gets an input S = {z 1 , . . . , z m }. Algorithm A is an (α, β, ǫ, δ, m)-PPAC learner for a concept class C over X using hypothesis class H if
Utility. Algorithm A is an (α, β, m)-PAC learner for C using H (as in Definition 2.7). When δ = 0 (pure privacy) we omit it from the list of parameters.
Note that the utility requirement in the above definition is an average-case requirement, as the learner is only required to do well on typical samples (i.e., samples drawn i.i.d. from a distribution D and correctly labeled by a target concept c ∈ C). In contrast, the privacy requirement is a worst-case requirement, and Inequality (1) must hold for every pair of neighboring databases (no matter how they were generated, even if they are not consistent with any concept in C).
Sanitization
Given a database S = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) containing elements from some domain X, the goal of sanitization mechanisms is to output (while preserving differential privacy) another databaseŜ that is in some sense similar to S. This returned databaseŜ is called a sanitized database.
Let c : X → {0, 1} be a concept. The counting query Q c :
Definition 2.17 (Sanitization [7] ). Let C be a class of concepts mapping X to {0, 1}. Let A be an algorithm that on an input database S ∈ X * outputs a description of a function Est :
The probability is over the coin tosses of algorithm A. If on an input database S algorithm A outputs another databaseŜ ∈ X * , and Est(·) is defined as Est(c) = Q c (Ŝ), then algorithm A is called a proper-sanitizer (or simply a sanitizer). As before, when δ = 0 (pure privacy) we omit it from the set of parameters.
Remark 2.18. Note that without the privacy requirements sanitization is a trivial task as it is possible to simply output the input database S. Furthermore, ignoring computational complexity, an (α, β, ǫ, δ, m)-improper-sanitizer can always be transformed into a (2α, β, ǫ, δ, m)-sanitizer, by finding a databaseŜ of m entries that is α-close to Est. Such a database must exist except with probability β (as in particular S is α-close to Est), and is 2α-close to S (by the triangle inequality).
The following theorems state some of the known results on the sample complexity of pure-privacy sanitizers. We start with an upper bound on the necessary sample complexity.
Theorem 2.19 (Blum et al. [7] ). There exists a constant Γ such that for any class of predicates C over a domain X, and any parameters α, β, ǫ, there exists an (α, β, ǫ, m)-sanitizer for C, provided that the size of the database, denoted m, is at least
The algorithm might not be efficient.
The above theorem states that, in principle, data sanitization is possible. The input database may be required to be as big as the representation size of elements in X. The next theorem states a general lower bound (far from the above upper bound) on the sample complexity of any concept class C. Better bounds are known for specific concept classes [21] .
Theorem 2.20 (Blum et al. [7] ). Let C be a class of predicates, and let m ≤ VC(C) 2
. For any 0 < β < 1 bounded away from 1 by a constant, for any ǫ ≤ 1, if A is an (α, β, ǫ, m)-sanitizer for C, then α ≥ 1 4+16ǫ . Recall that a proper sanitizer operates on an input database S ∈ X m , and outputs a sanitized databasê S ∈ X * . The following is a simple corollary of Theorem 2.14, stating that the size ofŜ does not necessarily depend on the size of the input database S. Theorem 2.21. Let C be a concept class. For any database S there exists a databaseŜ of size n = O(
In particular, the above theorem implies that an (α, β, ǫ, δ, m)-sanitizer A can always be transformed into a (2α, β, ǫ, δ, m)-sanitizer A ′ s.t. the sanitized databases returned by A ′ are always of fixed size n = O(
). This can be done by finding a databaseŜ of n entries that is α-close to the sanitized database returned by A. Using the triangle inequality,Ŝ is (w.h.p.) 2α-close to the input database.
Basic Differentially-Private Mechanisms
The Laplace Mechanism
The most basic constructions of differentially private algorithms are via the Laplace mechanism as follows.
Definition 2.22 (The Laplace Distribution).
A random variable has probability distribution Lap(b) if its probability density function is
Theorem 2.24 (The Laplacian Mechanism [13] ). Let f : X m → R n be a sensitivity k function. The mechanism A that on input D ∈ X m adds independently generated noise with distribution Lap( k ǫ ) to each of the n output terms of f (D) preserves ǫ-differential privacy. Moreover,
where A i (D) and f i (D) are the i th coordinates of A(D) and f (D).
The Exponential Mechanism
We next describe the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [24] . Let X be a domain and H a set of solutions. Given a quality function q : X * × H → N, and a database S ∈ X * , the goal is to chooses a solution h ∈ H approximately maximizing q(S, h). The mechanism chooses a solution probabilistically, where the probability mass that is assigned to each solution h increases exponentially with its quality q(S, h):
Input: parameter ǫ, finite solution set H, database S ∈ X m , and a sensitivity 1 quality function q.
1. Randomly choose h ∈ H with probability
Proposition 2.25 (Properties of the Exponential Mechanism). (i)
The exponential mechanism is ǫ-differentially private. (ii) Letê max f ∈H {q(S, f )} and ∆ > 0. The exponential mechanism outputs a solution h such that q(S, h) ≤ (ê − ∆m) with probability at most |H| · exp(−ǫ∆m/2).
Kasiviswanathan et al. [22] showed in 2008 that the exponential mechanism can be used as a generic private learner -when used with the quality function q(S, h) = |{i : h(x i ) = y i }|, the probability that the exponential mechanism outputs a hypothesis h such that error S (h) > min f ∈H {error S (f )} + ∆ is at most |H| · exp(−ǫ∆m/2). This results in a generic private proper-learner for every finite concept class C, with sample complexity O α,β,ǫ (log |C|).
Stability and Privacy -A dist
We restate a simplified variant of algorithm A dist by Smith and Thakurta [26] , which is an instantiation of the Propose-Test-Release framework [12] . Let q : X * × H → N be a sensitivity-1 quality function over a domain X and a set of solutions H. Given a database S ∈ X * , the goal is to choose a solution h ∈ H maximizing q(S, h), under the assumption that the optimal solution h scores much better than any other solution in H.
Algorithm A dist Input: parameters ǫ, δ, database S ∈ X * , sensitivity-1 quality function q. 1. Let h 1 = h 2 be two highest score solutions in H, where q(S, h 1 ) ≥ q(S, h 2 ). 
Proposition 2.26 (Properties of
(ii) When given an input database S for which gap ≥ 1 ǫ log( 1 βδ ), algorithm A dist outputs h 1 maximizing q(h, S) with probability at least (1 − β). For intuition, consider a target concept c j and an underlying distribution D. Whenever D(j) is noticeable, a typical sample S contains many copies of the point j labeled as 1. As every other point i = j will be labeled as 0, we expect q(S, j) to be significantly higher than any other q(S, i), and we can use algorithm A dist to identify j.
Proof. As algorithm A dist is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private, all that remains is the utility analysis. Fix a target concept c ℓ ∈ POINT d and a distribution D on X d . In a typical sample S, the only point that can appear with the label 1 is ℓ, and algorithm A dist has two possible outputs: ℓ, ⊥.
If D(ℓ) > α then (using the Chernoff bound), with probability at least 1 − exp(− such points, and the probability of A failing is at most
αβ , this probability is at most β.
Remark 3.3. Recall that the above algorithm outputs a random c i ∈ POINT d whenever A dist outputs ⊥. In order for this random c i to be good (w.h.p.) we needed 2 d (i.e., the number of possible concepts) to be at least 1 αβ . This requirement could be avoided by outputting the all zero hypothesis c 0 ≡ 0 whenever A dist outputs ⊥. However, this approach results in a proper learner only if we add the all zero concept to POINT d .
Towards a Proper
Note that VC(THRESH d ) = 1, and, therefore, there exists a proper non-private learner for THRESH d with sample complexity O α,β (1). As | THRESH d | = 2 d + 1, one can use the generic construction of Kasiviswanathan et al. [22] and get a proper ǫ-private learner for this class with sample complexity O α,β,ǫ (d). Feldman and Xiao [17] showed that this is in fact optimal, and every ǫ-private learner for this class (proper or improper) must have sample complexity Ω(d).
Our learner for POINT d relied on a strong "stability" property of the problem: Given a labeled sample, either a random concept is (w.h.p.) a good output, or, there is exactly one consistent concept in the class, and every other concept has large empirical error. This, however, is not the case when dealing with THRESH d . In particular, many hypotheses can have low empirical error, and changing a single entry of a sample S can significantly affect the set of hypotheses consistent with it.
In Section 3.3, we present a proper (ǫ, δ)-private learner for THRESH d with sample complexity (roughly) 2 O(log * (d)) . We use this section for motivating the construction. We start with two simplifying assumptions. First, when given a labeled sample S, we aim at choosing a hypothesis h ∈ THRESH d approximately minimizing the empirical error (rather than the generalization error). Second, we assume that we are given a "diverse" sample S that contains many points labeled as 1 and many points labeled as 0. Those two assumptions (and any other informalities made hereafter) will be removed in Section 3.3.
Assume we are given as input a sample S = (
labeled by some unknown c ℓ ∈ THRESH d . We would now like to choose a hypothesis h ∈ THRESH d with small empirical error on S, and we would like to do so while accessing the sample S only through differentially private tools.
We refer to points labeled as 1 in S as ones, and to points labeled as 0 as zeros. Imagine for a moment that we already have a differentially private algorithm that given S outputs an interval G ⊆ X d with the following two properties:
1. The interval G contains "a lot" of ones, and "a lot" of zeros in S.
Every interval I ⊆ X d of length ≤
|G| k does not contain, simultaneously, "too many" ones and "too many" zeros in S, where k is some constant.
Such an interval will be referred to as a k-good interval. Note that a k-good interval is, in particular, an ℓ-good interval for every ℓ ≥ k. Figure 1 illustrates such an interval G, where the dotted line represents the (unknown) target concept, and the bold dots correspond to sample points. Given such a 4-good interval G, we can (without using the sample S) define a set H of five hypotheses s.t. at least one of them has small empirical error. To see this, consider Figure 2 , where G is divided into four equal intervals g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 , and five hypotheses h 1 , . . . , h 5 are defined s.t. the points where they switch from one to zero are located at the edges of g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 . Now, as the interval G contains both ones and zeros, it must be that the target concept c ℓ switches from 1 to 0 inside G. Assume without loss of generality that this switch occurs inside g 2 . Note that g 2 is of length |G| 4 and, therefore, either does not contain too many ones, and h 2 is "close" to the target concept, or does not contain too many zeros, and h 3 is "close" to the target concept. For this argument to go through we need "not too many" to be smaller than αm (say 3 4 αm), where α is our approximation parameter and m is the sample size.
Figure 2: Extracting a small set of hypotheses from a good interval.
After defining such a set H, we could use the exponential mechanism to choose a hypothesis h ∈ H with small empirical error on S. As the size of H is constant, this requires only a constant number of samples. To conclude, finding a 4-good interval G (while preserving privacy) is sufficient for choosing a good hypothesis. We next explain how to find such an interval.
Assume, for now, that we have a differentially private algorithm that given a sample S, returns an interval length J s.t. there exists a 2-good interval G ⊆ X d of length |G| = J. This length J is used to find an explicit 4-good interval as follows. Divide X d into intervals {A i } of length 2J, and into intervals {B i } of length 2J right shifted by J as in Figure 3 .
Figure 3: Dividing the axis X d into intervals of length 2J.
As the promised 2-good interval G is of length J, at least one of the above intervals contains G. We next explain how to privately choose such interval. If, e.g., G ⊆ A 2 then A 2 contains both a lot of zeros and a lot of ones. The target concept must switch inside A 2 , and, therefore, every other A i = A 2 cannot contain both zeros and ones. For every interval A i , define its quality q(A i ) to be the minimum between the number of zeros in A i and the number of ones in A i . Therefore, q(A 2 ) is large, while q(A i ) = 0 for every A i = A 2 . That is, A 2 scores much better than any other A i under this quality function q. The sensitivity of q() is one and we can use algorithm A dist to privately identify A 2 . It suffices, e.g., that q(A 2 ) ≥ 1 4 αm, and we can, therefore, set our "a lot" bound to be 1 4 αm. Recall that G ⊆ A 2 is a 2-good interval, and that |A 2 | = 2|G|. The identified A 2 is, therefore, a 4-good interval.
To conclude, if we could indeed find (while preserving privacy) a length J s.t. there exists a 2-good interval G of that length, then our task would be completed.
Computing the interval length J. At first attempt, one might consider preforming a binary search for such a length 0 ≤ J ≤ 2 d , in which every comparison will be made using the Laplace mechanism. More specifically, for every length 0 ≤ J ≤ 2 d , define
If, e.g., Q(J) = 100 for some J, then there exists an interval [a, b] ⊆ X d of length J that contains at least 100 ones and at least 100 zeros. Moreover, every interval of length ≤ J either contains at most 100 ones, or, contains at most 100 zeros. Note that Q(·) is a monotonically non-decreasing function, and that Q(0) = 0 (as in a correctly labeled sample a point cannot appear both with the label 1 and with the label 0). Recall our assumption that the sample S is "diverse" (contains many points labeled as 1 and many points labeled as 0), and, therefore, Q(2 d ) is large. Hence, there exists a J s.t. Q(J) is "big enough" (say at least (2), every interval of length < J cannot contain too many ones and too many zeros simultaneously. Such a J can easily be (privately) obtained using a (noisy) binary search. However, as there are d noisy comparisons, this solution requires a sample of size d O(1) in order to achieve reasonable utility guarantees.
As a second attempt, one might consider preforming a binary search, not on 0 ≤ J ≤ 2 d , but rather on the power j of an interval of length 2 j . That is, preforming a search for a power 0 ≤ j ≤ d for which there exists a 2-good interval of length 2 j . Here there are only log(d) noisy comparisons, and the sample size is reduced to log Ω(1) (d). Again, a (noisy) binary search on 0 ≤ j ≤ d can (privately) yield an appropriate length J = 2 j s.t. Q(2 j ) is "big enough", while Q(2 j−1 ) is "small enough". Such a J = 2 j is, indeed, a length of a 2-good interval. Too see this, note that as Q(2 j ) is "big enough", there exists an interval of length 2 j containing lots of ones and lots of zeros. Moreover, as Q(2 j−1 ) is "small enough", every interval of length 2 j−1 = 1 2 2 j cannot contain too many ones and too many zeros simultaneously.
Remark 3.5. A binary search as above would have to operate on noisy values of Q(·) (as otherwise differential privacy cannot be obtained). For this reason, we set the bounds for "big enough" and "small enough" to overlap. Namely, we search for a value j such that Q(2
4 m, where α is our approximation parameter, and m is the sample size.
To summarize, using a binary search we find a length J = 2 j such that there exists a 2-good interval of length J. Then, using A dist , we find a 4-good interval. Finally, we partition this interval to 4 intervals, and using the exponential mechanism we choose a starting point or end point of one of these intervals as our the threshold.
We will apply recursion to reduce the costs of computing J = 2 j to 2
. The tool performing the recursion would be formalized and analyzed in the next section. This tool will later be used in our construction of a proper (ǫ, δ)-private learner for THRESH d .
Privately Approximating Quasi-Concave Promise Problems
We next define the notions that enable our recursive algorithm. d ], the approximation parameter to α and the quality promise to m. Define Q(S, k) = |{i : c k (x i ) = y i }|; i.e., Q(S, k) is the number of points in S correctly classified by c k ∈ THRESH d . Note that the target concept c j satisfies Q(S, j) = m. Our task is to find a hypothesis
Consider j, the index of the target concept, and assume w.l.o.g. that j ≤ v (the other case is symmetric). That is, j ≤ v ≤ w. Note that c v errs only on points in between j and v, and c w errs on all these points. That is, error S (c v ) ≤ error S (c w ), and, therefore, Q(S, v) ≥ λ. See Figure 4 for an illustration. Remark 3.9. Note that if the sample S in the above example is not consistent with any c ∈ THRESH d , then there is no j s.t. Q(S, j) = m, and the quality promise is void. Moreover, in such a case Q(S, ·) might not be quasi-concave.
We are interested in solving quasi-concave promise problems while preserving differential privacy. As motivated by Remark 3.9, privacy must be preserved even when Q(S, ·) is not quasi-concave or Q(S, p) < r for all p ∈ [0, T ]. Our algorithm RecConcave is presented in Figure 5 (see inline comments for some of the underlying intuition).
We start the analysis of Algorithm RecConcave by bounding the number of recursive calls.
Notation. Given an integer n, let log ⌈ * ⌉ (n) denote the number of times that the function ⌈log(x)⌉ must be iteratively applied before the result is less or equal to 1, i.e., log ⌈ * ⌉ (n) = 1 + log ⌈ * ⌉ ⌈log(n)⌉ if n > 1 and zero otherwise. Observe that log ⌈ * ⌉ (n) = log * (n). Before proceeding to the privacy analysis, we make the following simple observation.
Observation 3.11. Let {f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f N } be a set of sensitivity-1 functions mapping X * to R. Then f max (S) = max i {f i (S)} and f min (S) = min i {f i (S)} are sensitivity-1 functions.
1 Clearly log ⌈ * ⌉ (n) ≥ log * (n). Let ℓ be the smallest number of the form 2 2
We have that log * (ℓ) = log * (n), and that log ⌈ * ⌉ (ℓ) = log * (ℓ) (as all of the numbers in the iterative process of log ⌈ * ⌉ (ℓ) will be integers). As log ⌈ * ⌉ (·) is monotonically non-decreasing we get log ⌈ * ⌉ (n) ≤ log ⌈ * ⌉ (ℓ) = log * (ℓ) = log * (n).
Algorithm RecConcave Inputs: Range [0, T ], quality function Q, quality promise r, parameters α, ǫ, δ, and a database S. Optional Input: a bound N ≥ 1 on the number of recursive calls (set N = ∞ otherwise).
1. If [(T ≤ 32) or (N = 1)], then use the exponential mechanism with the quality function Q and the parameter ǫ to choose and return an index j ∈ [0, . . . , T ]. Otherwise set N = N − 1.
2. Let T ′ be the smallest power of 2 s.t. T ′ ≥ T , and define Q(S, i) = min{0, Q(S, T )} for
See Figure 6 for an illustration. 
Define the function q(S
, j) = min L(S, j) − (1 − α)r, r − L(S, j + 1) where 0 ≤ j ≤ log(T ′ ).
Let
% R is the promise parameter for the recursive call. Note that for the maximal j with L(S, j)
)r we get
6. Execute RecConcave recursively on the range {0, . . . , log(T ′ )}, the quality function q(·, ·), the promise R, an approximation parameter 1 4 , and ǫ, δ, N . Denote the returned value by k, and let K = 2 k .
% If the call to RecConcave was successful, then k is s.t. q(S, k)
)r. Note in the top level call the approximation parameter α is arbitrary (given as input), and that in all of the lower level calls the approximation parameter is fixed at 7. Divide [0, T ′ ] into the following intervals of length 8K (the last ones might be trimmed): )r for all i ∈ {0, . . . , T } \ Ag.
For every such interval
9. Use algorithm A dist with parameters ǫ, δ and the quality function u(·, ·), once to choose an interval A ∈ {A i }, and once more to choose an interval B ∈ {B i }.
% By the properties of A dist , w.h.p. at least one of the returned A and B is good.
10. Use the exponential mechanism with the quality function Q(·, ·) and parameter ǫ to choose and return an index j ∈ (A ∪ B).
% We show that a constant fraction of the solutions in (A ∪ B) have high qualities, and, hence, the exponential mechanism needs only a constant sample complexity in order to achieve good utility guarantees. 
The reason for defining q(·, ·) is the following. We were interested in identifying a j with an appropriate lower bound on L(S, j) and with an appropriate upper bound on L(S, j + 1). That is, in order to decide whether a given j is a good, we need to check both L(S, j) and L(S, j + 1). After defining q(S, ·), we can simply look for a j with a high q(S, j). A high q(S, j) implies upper and lower bounds (respectively) on L(S, j), L(S, j + 1).
We now proceed with the privacy analysis of algorithm RecConcave.
Lemma 3.12. When executed on a sensitivity-1 quality function Q, parameters ǫ, δ, and a bound on the recursion depth N , algorithm RecConcave preserves (3N ǫ, 3N δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. Note that since Q is a sensitivity-1 function, all of the quality functions defined throughout the execution of RecConcave are of sensitivity 1 (see Observation 3.11). In each recursive call algorithm RecConcave invokes at most three differentially private mechanisms -once with the Exponential Mechanism (on Step 1 or on Step 11), and at most twice with algorithm A dist (on Step 9). As there are at most N recursive calls, we conclude that throughout the entire execution algorithm RecConcave invokes most 3N mechanisms, each (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. Hence, using Theorem 2.4, algorithm RecConcave is (3N ǫ, 3N δ)-differentially private.
We now turn to proving the correctness of algorithm RecConcave. As the proof is by induction (on the number of recursive calls), we need to show that each of the recursive calls to RecConcave is made with appropriate inputs. We first claim that the function q(S, ·) constructed in Step 4 is quasi-concave. Note that for this claim we do not need to assume that Q(S, ·) is quasi-concave. Claim 3.13. Let Q : X * × [0, T ] → R be a quality function, and let the functions L(·, ·) and q(·, ·) be as in steps 3, 4 of algorithm RecConcave. Then, for every S ∈ X * , it holds that q(S, ·) is quasi-concave.
Proof. Fix S ∈ X * . First observe that the function
is monotonically non-increasing (as a function of j). To see this, note that if L(S, j) = X , then there exists an interval of length 2 j in which every point has quality at least X . In particular, there exists such an interval of length
and that r − L(S, ℓ + 1) ≥ r − L(S, i + 1) ≥ x. Therefore, q(S, ℓ) ≥ x, and q(S, ·) is quasi-concave.
Notation. We use log ⌈N ⌉ (·) to denote the outcome of N iterative applications of the function ⌈log(·)⌉,
Lemma 3.14. Let Q : X * × [0, T ] → R be a sensitivity-1 quality function, and let S ∈ X * be a database s.t.
Q(S,
When executed on S, [0, T ], r, α, ǫ, δ, N , algorithm RecConcave fails to outputs an index j s.t. Q(S, j) ≥ (1 − α)r with probability at most 2βN .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of recursive calls, denoted as t. For t = 1 (i.e., T ≤ 32 or N = 1), the exponential mechanism ensures that for r ≥ 2 αǫ log( T β ), the probability of algorithm RecConcave failing to output a j s.t. Q(S, j) ≥ (1 − α)r is at most β.
Assume that the stated lemma holds whenever algorithm RecConcave performs at most t − 1 recursive calls, and let S, [0, T ], r, α, ǫ, δ, N be inputs (satisfying the conditions of Lemma 3.14) on which algorithm RecConcave preforms t recursive calls. Consider the first call in the execution of RecConcave on those inputs, and denote by T ′ the smallest power of 2 s.t. T ′ ≥ T . In order to apply the inductive assumption, we need to show that for the recursive call in step 6, all the conditions of Lemma 3.14 hold.
We first note that by Claim 3.13, the quality function q(S, ·) defined of step 4 is quasi-concave. We next show that the recursive call is preformed with an appropriate quality promise R = as the approximation parameter, and with a quality promise R satisfying
We next show that w.h.p. at least one of the two intervals A, B chosen on Step 9, contains a lot of points with high score. Denote the index returned by the recursive call of step 6 as k. By the inductive assumption, with probability at least (1 − 2β(N − 1)), the index k is s.t. q(S, k) ≥ (1 − Consider the following two intervals:
, and denote P = P 1 ∪ P 2 (these two intervals might be trimmed if p is close to the edges of [0, T ]). Assuming P 1 , P 2 are not trimmed, they both are intervals of length 2 · 2 k , and, therefore, each of them contains a point i 1 , i 2 respectively with quality Q(S, i 1 ), Q(S, i 2 ) ≤ (1 −
)r i 1 ℓ Figure 7 : A point ℓ / ∈ P cannot have quality greater than (1 − 3α 8 )r.
Note that if P 1 (or P 2 ) is trimmed, then there are no points on the left of (or on the right of) P . So, the interval P contains the point p with quality Q(S, p) ≥ r and every point i ∈ [0, T ] \ P has quality of at most (1 − 3α 8 )r. Moreover, P is of length 4 · 2 k − 1. As the intervals of the partitions {A i } and {B i } are of length 8 · 2 k , and the {B i }'s are shifted by 4 · 2 k , there must exist an interval C ∈ {A i } ∪ {B i } s.t. P ⊆ C. Assume without loss of generality that C ∈ {A i }.
Recall that the quality u(S, ·) of an interval I is defined as the maximal quality Q(S, i) of a point i ∈ I. Therefore, as p ∈ C, the quality of C is at least r. On the other hand, the quality of every A i = C is at most (1 − . By the properties of A dist , with probability at least (1 − β), the chosen interval A in step 9 is s.t. P ⊆ A. We proceed with the analysis assuming that this is the case.
Consider again the interval P containing the point p, and recall that there exists an interval G of length 2 k containing only points with quality Q(S, ·) of at least (1 − 5α 8 )r. Such an interval must be contained in P . Otherwise, by the quasi-concavity of Q(S, ·), all the points between G and the point p must also have quality at least (1 − 5α 8 )r, and, in particular, P must indeed contain such an interval. So, the chosen interval A in step 9 is of length 8 · 2 k , and it contains a sub interval of length 2 k in which every point has quality at least (1 − 
, the exponential mechanism ensures that the probability of step 10 failing to return a point h ∈ (A ∪ B) with Q(S, h) ≥ (1 − α)r is at most β.
3
All in all, with probability at least (1
Combining Lemma 3.12 and Lemma 3.14 we get the following theorem. )r, the probability that the exponential mechanism outputs a specific solution h ∈ (A ∪ B) with Q(S, h) ≥ (1 − α)r is at most . Hence, the probability that the exponential mechanism outputs any solution h ∈ (A ∪ B) with Q(S, h) ≥ (1 − α)r is at most 16
, which is at most β for our choice of r.
If S is s.t. Q(S, ·) is quasi-concave, and if
then algorithm RecConcave fails to outputs an index j s.t. Q(S, j) ≥ (1 − α)r with probability at most β.
Remark 3.16. Recall that the number of recursive calls on a range [0, T ] is always bounded by log * (T ), and note that for N = log * (T ) we have that log ⌈N ⌉ (T ) ≤ 1. Therefore, the promise requirement in Inequality (2) can be replaced with 8
Remark 3.17. The computational efficiency of algorithm RecConcave depends on the quality function Q(·, ·). Note, however, that it suffices to efficiently implement the top level call (i.e., without the recursion). This is true because an iteration of algorithm RecConcave, operating on a range [0, T ], can easily be implemented in time poly(T ), and the range given as input to recursive calls is logarithmic in the size of the initial range. 
A Proper
Proof. By Theorem 3.15, algorithm LearnT hresholds is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. For the utility analysis, fix a target concept c j ∈ THRESH d , and a distribution D on X d , and let S be a sample drawn i.i.d. from D and labeled by c j . Define the following two good events:
Clearly, when both E 1 , E 2 occur, algorithm LearnT hresholds succeeds in outputting an α-good hypothesis for c j and D. Note that as VC(THRESH d ) = 1, Theorem 2.14 ensures that for m ≥ Next, note that for the target concept c j it holds that Q(S, j) = m, and algorithm RecConcave is executed on step 3 with a valid quality promise. Moreover, as shown in Example 3.8, algorithm RecConcave is executed with a quasi-concave quality function.
So, algorithm RecConcave is executed on step 3 with a valid quality promise and with a quasi-concave quality function. For
algorithm RecConcave ensures that with probability at least (1 − β 2 ), the index k at step 2 is s.t. Q(k) ≥ (1− α 2 )m. The empirical error of c k is at most α 2 in such a case. Therefore, Event E 2 happens with probability at least (1 − β 2 ). Overall, we conclude that LearnT hresholds is a proper (α, β, ǫ, δ, m)-PPAC learner for C, where
Remark 3.19. By using N = log * (2 d ) in the above theorem, we can bound the sample complexity of LearnT hresholds by
αβδ .
Axis-Aligned Rectangles in High Dimension
Consider the class of all axis-aligned rectangles (or hyperrectangles) in the Euclidean space R n . A concept in this class could be thought of as the product of n intervals, one on each axis. We briefly describe an efficient approximate-private proper-learner for a discrete version of this class. The VC dimension of this class is 2n, and, thus, it can be learned non-privately with sample complexity O α,β (n). Note that | RECTANGLE
O(nd) , and, therefore, the generic construction of Kasiviswanathan et al. [22] yields an inefficient proper ǫ-private learner for this class with sample complexity O α,β,ǫ (nd).
In [23] , Kearns gave an efficient (noise resistant) non-private learner for this class. The learning model there was a variant of the statistical queries model [23] , in which the learner is also being given access to the underling distribution D. Every learning algorithm in the statistical queries model can be transformed to satisfy differential privacy while preserving efficiency [6, 22] . However, as Kearns' algorithm assumes direct access to D, this transformation cannot be applied directly.
Kearns' algorithm begins by sampling D and using the drawn samples to divide each axis i ∈ [n] into O(n/α) intervals I i = {I} with the property that the x i component of a random point from D is approximately equally likely to fall into each of the intervals in I i . The algorithm proceeds by estimating the boundary of the target rectangle separately for every dimension i: For every interval I ∈ I i , the algorithm uses statistical queries to estimate the probability that a positively labeled input has its x i component in I, i.e., p I = Pr x∼D (x is labeled 1) ∧ (x i ∈ I) .
The algorithm places the left boundary of the hypothesis rectangle in the i-th dimension at the left-most interval I ∈ I i such that p I is significant, and analogously on the right.
Note that once the interval sets I i are defined for each axis i ∈ [n], estimating every single p I can be done via statistical queries, and can, therefore, be made private using the transformation of [6, 22] . Alternatively, estimating (simultaneously) all of the p I 's (on the i th axis) could be done privately using the laplacian mechanism. This use of the laplacian mechanism is known as a histogram (see Theorem 2.24).
Thus, our task is to privately partition each axis. The straight forward approach for privately finding I i is by a noisy binary search for the boundary of each of the n/α intervals (in each axis). This would result in Ω(d) noisy comparisons, which, in turn, results in a private learner with a high sample complexity.
We now overcome this issue using a sanitizer for THRESH d . Such a sanitizer will be constructed in Section 4.2; here we use it for privately finding I i . . Standard arguments in learning theory (specifically, Theorem 2.14) state that for a large enough sample (whose size is bigger than the VC dimensions of the intervals class) w.h.p.
So, in order to divide the i th axis we apply the above mentioned sanitizer, and divide the axis using the returned sanitized database. In order to accumulate error of up to α/n on each axis (as required by Kearns' algorithm), we need to execute the above mentioned sanitizer with an approximation parameter of (roughly) α/n. Every such execution requires, therefore, a sample of O α,β,ǫ,δ n 2.5 · 8 log * (d) elements. As there are n such executions (one for each axis), using Theorem 2.5 (composition theorem), the described learner is of sample complexity O α,β,ǫ,δ n 3 · 8 log * (d) . 
This should be contrasted with θ α,β (n), which is the non-private sample complexity for this class (as the VC-dimension of RECTANGLE n d is 2n), and with θ α,β,ǫ (nd) which is the pure-private sample complexity for this class. 4 
Sanitization with Approximate Privacy
In this section we present (ǫ, δ)-private sanitizers for several concept classes, and separate the database size necessary for (ǫ, 0)-private sanitizers from the database size sufficient for (ǫ, δ)-private sanitizers.
The Choosing Mechanism
Recall that in our private PAC learner for POINT d , given a typical labeled sample, there exists a unique concept in the class that stands out (we used algorithm A dist to identify it). This is not the case in the context of sanitization, as a given database S can have many α-close sanitized databasesŜ. We will overcome this issue by using the following private tool for approximating a restricted class of choosing problems.
A function q : X * × F → N defines an optimization problem over the domain X and solution set F : Given a dataset S over domain X choose f ∈ F that (approximately) maximizes q(S, f ). We are interested in a subset of these optimization problems, which we call bounded-growth choice problems. In this section we consider a database S ⊆ X * as a multiset.
Definition 4.1. Given q and S define opt q (S) = max f ∈F {q(S, f )}. A solution f ∈ F is called α-good for a database S if q(S, f ) ≥ opt q (S) − α|S|.
Definition 4.2. A quality function
In words, the second requirement means that (i) Adding an element to the database could either have no effect on the score of a solution f , or can increase the score by exactly 1; and (ii) There could be at most k solutions whose scores are increased (by 1). Note that a k-bounded-growth quality function is, in particular, a sensitivity-1 function as two neighboring S, S ′ must be of the form D ∪ {x 1 } and D ∪ {x 2 } respectively.
As an example of a 1-bounded growth quality function, consider the following q : X * × X → N. Given a database S = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) containing elements from some domain X, define q(S, a) = {i : x i = a} . That is, q(S, a) is the number of appearances of a in S. Clearly, q(∅, f ) = 0 for all f ∈ X. Moreover, adding an element a ∈ X to a database S increases by 1 the quality of q(S, a), and does not effect the quality of every other b = a.
The choosing mechanism (in Figure 8 ) is a private algorithm for approximately solving bounded-growth choice problems.
Step 1 of the algorithm checks whether a good solutions exist, as otherwise any solution is approximately optimal (and the mechanism returns ⊥).
Step 2 invokes the exponential mechanism, but with the small set G(S) instead of F .
Choosing Mechanism
Input: a database S, a quality function q, and parameters α, β, ǫ, δ. 
Hence, for every set of outputs R
Case (b): There existsf s.t. q(S,f ) ≥ αm 4 . Let G(S) and G(S ′ ) be the sets used in step 2 in the execution S and on S ′ respectively. We will show that the following two facts hold:
We first show that the two facts imply that the lemma holds for Case (b). Let B G(S) \ G(S ′ ), and note that as q is k-growth-bounded, |B| ≤ k. Denote B = {b 1 , . . . , b ℓ }, where ℓ ≤ k. Using the above two facts, for every set of outputs R we have
For proving Fact 1, let f ∈ G(S) \ G(S ′ ). That is, q(S, f ) ≥ 1 and q(S ′ , f ) = 0. As q is (in particular) a sensitivity-1 function, it must be, therefore, that q(S, f ) = 1. As there existsf ∈ S with q(S,f ) ≥ 
Using Fact 3, for every possible output f ∈ G(S) ∩ G(S ′ ) we have that
We now prove Fact 3. Denote X
h∈G(S)
exp( ǫ 4 q(S, h)). We first show that
That is, we need to show that X ≥ Now, recall that as q is k-growth-bounded, for every h ∈ F it holds that |q(S, h)−q(S ′ , h)| ≤ 1. Moreover,
This concludes the proof of Fact 3, and completes the proof of the lemma.
The utility analysis for the choosing mechanism is rather straight forward:
Lemma 4.5. When q is a k-bounded-growth quality function, given a database S of m ≥ 16 αǫ ln( 16k αβǫδ ) elements, the choosing mechanism outputs an α-good solution for S with probability at least 1 − β.
Proof. Note that if q(S, f ) < αm for every solution f , then every solution is an α-good solution, and the mechanism cannot fail. Assume, therefore, that there exists a solution f s.t. q(f, S) ≥ αm, and recall that the mechanism defines best(S) as max f ∈F {q(f, S)} + Lap( 4 ǫ ). Now consider the following two good events:
The exponential mechanism chooses a solution f s.t. q(S, f ) ≥ opt(S) − αm.
If E 2 occurs then the mechanism outputs an α-good solution. Note that the event E 2 is contained inside the event E 1 , and, therefore, Pr[ 
αǫ ln( 16k αβǫδ ) we get that with probability at least (1 − β) it outputs an α-good solution for its input database.
(ǫ, δ)-Private Sanitizer for POINT d
Beimel et al. [3] showed that every pure ǫ-private sanitizer for POINT d , must operate on databases of Ω(d) elements. In this section we present an (ǫ, δ)-private sanitizer for POINT d with sample complexity O α,β,ǫ,δ (1). This separates the database size necessary for (ǫ, 0)-private sanitizers from the database size sufficient for (ǫ, δ)-private sanitizers. Our sanitizing algorithm invokes the Choosing Mechanism to choose points x ∈ X d . Consider the following q : X * d × X d → N. Given a database S ∈ X m d and a point x ∈ X d , define q(S, x) to be the number of appearances of x in S. By Example 4.3, q defines a 1-bounded-growth choosing problem. Moreover, given a subset R ⊆ X d consider the restriction of q to the subset R defined as q R (S, x) = q(S, x) for x ∈ R and zero otherwise. The function q R is a 1-bounded-growth quality function. Our sanitizer SanP oints appears in Figure 9 .
Algorithm SanP oints Inputs: a database S = (x 1 , . . . , x m ), and parameters α, β, ǫ, δ. Proof. We start with the utility analysis. Fix a database S = (x 1 , . . . , x m ), and consider the execution of algorithm SanP oints on S. Denote the element chosen by the Choosing Mechanism on the i th iteration of step 2 by b i , and denote the set of all such elements as B = {b 1 , . . . , b 2/α } \ {⊥}. Moreover, let R i denote the set R as is was at the beginning of the i th iteration. Consider the following two bad events:
If none of these two events happen, then algorithm SanP oints succeeds in outputting an estimation Est s.t.
We now bound the probability of both events. 
Using the union bound on the number of iterations, we get that with probability at least (1− β 2 ), Inequality (5) holds for every iteration 1 ≤ i ≤ α 2 . We will now see that in such a case, event E 2 does not occur. Assume to the contrary that there exists an a / ∈ B s.t. Q ca (S) > α. Therefore, for every iteration i it holds that max x∈X d {q Ri (S, x)} > αm and thus q Ri (S, b i ) > α 2 m. This means that there exist (at least) 2 α different points b i ∈ X d that appear in S more than α 2 m times, which contradicts the fact that the size of S is m. All in all, Pr[E 2 ] ≤ β 2 , and the probability of algorithm SanP oints failing to output an estimation Est s.t. ∀c j ∈ POINT d Q cj (S) − Est(j) ≤ α is at most β.
We now proceed with the simple privacy analysis. Note that algorithm SanP oints accesses its input database only using the Choosing Mechanism on step 2a and using the laplacian mechanism on step 2b. Every interaction with the laplacian mechanism preserves (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy, and there exactly 2 α such interactions. For our choice of m, every interaction with the Choosing Mechanism preserves (ǫ,δ)-differential privacy, and there are exactly 2 α such interactions. Applying Theorem 2.5 (the composition theorem) with our choice ofǫ,δ, we get that algorithm SanP oints preserves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
The above algorithm SanP oints can also be used as a sanitizer for the concept class k-POINT d , defined as follows. For every A ⊆ X d s.t. |A| = k, the concept class k-POINT d contains the concept c A :
Consider the following algorithm.
A Sanitizer for k-POINT d . Input: parameters α, β, ǫ, δ and a dataset S of m elements.
1. Execute SanP oints on S, α k , β, ǫ, δ, and denote the returned function as Est(·). 2. For every I ⊆ X d s.t. |I| = k, define e(I) = i∈I Est(i). Proof. The privacy of the above algorithm is immediate. Fix a database S = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) ∈ X m d . By Theorem 4.6, with probability at least (1−β), the estimation Est on step 1 is s.t.
Return e(·).
As | THRESH d | = 2 d + 1, one can use the generic construction of Blum et al. [7] , and get an ǫ-private sanitizer for this class with sample complexity O(d). By [3] , this is the best possible when guaranteeing pure privacy (ignoring the dependency on α, β and ǫ). We next present a recursive sanitizer for THRESH d , guaranteeing approximated privacy and exhibiting sample complexity O α,β,ǫ,δ (8
The algorithm maintains its sanitized databaseŜ as a global variable, which is initialized as the empty set. In addition, for the privacy analysis, we would need a bound on the number of recursive calls. It will be convenient to maintain another global variable, calls, initialized at the desired bound and decreased in every recursive call.
Given a database S = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ X + 1, ℓ] . As the number of points in [a,b] is "not too small", the depth of this recursion is bounded. Our sanitizer SanT hresholds appears in Figure 11 . We next prove its properties, starting with the privacy analysis. Proof. Every iteration of algorithm SanT hresholds can access its input database at most twice using the laplacian mechanism (on steps 2,11), at most once using the Choosing Mechanism (on step 9 or on step 10b), and at most once using algorithm RecConcave (on step 8). By the properties of the laplacian mechanism, every interaction with it preserves (ǫ, 0)-differential privacy. Note that the quality function with which we call the Choosing Mechanism is at most 2-growth-bounded. Therefore, as m ≥ 1024 αǫ ln( 2048 αβǫδ ), every such interaction with the Choosing Mechanism preserves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Last, for our choice ofǫ,δ, every interaction with algorithm RecConcave preserves (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
That is, throughout its entire execution, algorithm SanT hresholds invokes at most 4c mechanisms, each (ǫ, δ)-differentially private. By Theorem 2.5, algorithm SanT hresholds is (ǫ, 5cδ)-differential private, wherẽ
We start the utility analysis of SanT hresholds with the following simple claim.
Claim 4.9. The function Q(S, ·), defined on step 6, is quasi-concave.
Proof. First note that the function I(S, ·) defined on step 5 is non-decreasing. Now, let u ≤ v ≤ w be s.t. Q(S, u), Q(S, w) ≥ x. That is, Using the fact that I(S, ·) is non-decreasing, we have that I(S, u) ≤ I(S, v) and that I(S, v − 1) ≤ I(S, w − 1). Therefore
and Q(S, v) ≥ x.
Note that every iteration of algorithm SanT hresholds draws at most 2 random samples (on steps 2 and 11) from Lap( 1 ǫ ). We now proceed with the utility analysis by identifying 3 good events that occur with high probability (over the coin tosses of the algorithm). 
We now bound each of those terms, starting with Pr[B 1 ]. In every single draw, the probability of | Lap( . Plugging those inequalities in the definition of Q(·, ·), for this j we have that Q(S, j) ≥ αm 32 = r, and the quality promise used to execute algorithm RecConcave is valid. Moreover, the function Q(S, ·) defined on step 6 is quasi-concave (by Claim 4.9). And so, for m ≥ 8
, algorithm RecConcave ensures that with probability at least (1−β), the returned z is s.t. Q(S, z) ≥ (1 − For the analysis of Pr[B 3 |B 1 ∧ B 2 ], consider an iteration of algorithm SanT hresholds that halts after step 13, and let z be the value returned by algorithm RecConcave on step 8. As event B 2 has occurred, Q(S, z) ≥ So, given that event (B 1 ∧ B 2 ) has occurred, in every iteration that halts after step 13, the probability of
128 is at most β. As there are at most c iterations, we see that Pr[
All in all, for cβ ≤ 3 we get that
Every iteration of algorithm SanT hresholds that does not halt on step 1 defines an interval [a, b] (on exactly one of the steps 3,9,10b). This interval [a, b] is not part of any range that is given as input to any future recursive call. Moreover, if none of the recursive calls throughout the execution of SanT hresholds halts on step 1, these [a, b] intervals form a partition of the initial range. We now proceed with the utility analysis by identifying yet another 3 good events (at a somewhat higher level) that occur whenever (B 1 ∧ B 2 ∧ B 3 ) occur.
Claim 4.11. Fix α, β, ǫ, δ. Let SanT hresholds be executed with calls initialized to c ≥ 77 α , and on a database S of m ≥ 8
elements. With probability at least (1 − 3cβ) the following 3 events happen: E 1 : There are at most 77 α recursive calls, none of them halts on the first step.
Proof. Consider again events B 1 , B 2 , B 3 defined in Claim 4.10. We will show that the event (E 1 ∧ E 2 ∧ E 3 ) is implied by (B 1 ∧ B 2 ∧ B 3 ) (which happens with probability at least (1 − 3cβ) by Claim 4.10). We, therefore, continue the proof assuming that (B 1 ∧ B 2 ∧ B 3 ) has occurred. We begin by showing that event E 1 occurs. Denote the number of iterations that halts on steps 1-3 as y 1 , and the number of complete iterations (i.e., that halts after step 13) as y 2 . Clearly, y 1 ≤ 2y 2 . Now, as event B 3 has occurred, we have that every iteration that halts after step 13 z has no meaning. At any case, we have that E 2 must occur.
All in all,
We will now complete the utility analysis by showing that the input database S and the sanitized databasê S (at the end of SanT hresholds' execution) are α-close whenever (E 1 ∧ E 2 ∧ E 3 ) occurs. 
elements. With probability at least
(1 − 3cβ), the sanitized databaseŜ at the end of the execution is s.t.
Proof. Denote S = (x 1 , . . . , x m ), andŜ = (x 1 , . . . ,x n ). Note that |S| = m and that |Ŝ| = n. By Claim 4.11, the event E 1 ∩ E 2 ∩ E 3 occurs with probability at least (1 − 3cβ). We will show that in such a case, the sanitized databaseŜ is s.t. |Q cj (S) − Q cj (Ŝ)| ≤ α for every c j ∈ THRESH d .
As event E 1 has occurred, the intervals d − 1, and a i+1 = b i + 1. Now fix some c j ∈ THRESH d , and let t be s.t. j ∈ [a t , b t ]. We have that
As event E 2 ∩ E 3 has occurred,
As event E 1 has occurred, t ≤ 77 α , and
Similar arguments show that Q cj (S) ≥ − 
Similar arguments show that
. By the triangle inequality we have therefore that
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of Lemma 4.12 and Lemma 4.8. 
Sanitization with Pure Privacy
Here we give a general lower bound on the database size of pure private sanitizers. Beimel et al. [3] showed that every pure ǫ-private sanitizer for POINT d must operate on databases of Ω(d) elements. With slight modifications, their proof technique can yield a much more general result.
Definition 4.14. Given a concept class C over a domain X, we denote the effective size of X w.r.t. C as
That is, X C is the cardinality of the biggest subset X ⊆ X s.t. every two different elements of X are labeled differently by at least one concept in C.
Lemma 4.15. Let C be a concept class over a domain X. For every (α, β, ǫ, m)-sanitizer for C (proper or improper) it holds that m = Ω 1 ǫα (log X C + log(1/β)) .
Proof. Let X ⊆ X be s.t. | X| = X C and every two different elements of X are labeled differently by at least one concept in C. Fix some x 1 ∈ X, and for every x i ∈ X, construct a database S i ∈ X m by setting (1 − 3α)m entries as x 1 and the remaining 3αm entries as x i (for i = 1 all entries of S 1 are x 1 ). Note that for all i = j, databases S i and S j differ on 3αm entries. Let S i be the set of all databases that are α-close to S i . That is,
For every i = j we have that S i ∩ S j = ∅. To see this, let f ∈ C be s.t. f (x i ) = f (x j ) (such a concept exists, by the definition of X). For this f it holds that |Q f (S i ) − Q f (S j )| = 3α. Therefore (by the triangle inequality), there cannot exist a database S for which
Let A be an (α, β, ǫ, m)-sanitizer for C. Without loss of generality, we can assume that A is a proper sanitizer (otherwise, we could transform it into a proper one by replacing α with 2α). See Remark 2.18.
For all i, on input S i the mechanism A should pick an output from S i with probability at least 1 − β. Hence,
(the sets S i are disjoint)
(by the differential privacy of A)
Solving for m, we get that m = Ω( 1 ǫα (log X C + log(1/β))). Lemma 4.15, together with a lower bound from [7] , yields the following result: The above lower bound is the best possible general lower bound in terms of X C and VC(C) (up to a factor of log VC(C)). To see this, let n < d, and consider a concept class over X d containing the following two kinds of concepts. The first kind are 2 n concepts shattering the left n points of X d (and zero everywhere else). The second kind are (2 d − n) "point concepts" over the right (2 d − n) points of X d (and zero on the first n). Formally, for every j = (j 0 , j 1 , . . . , j n−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} n , let c j : X d → {0, 1} be defines as c j (x) = j x if x < n and c j (x) = 0 otherwise. Define the concept class C L = {c j } j∈Xn . For every n ≤ j < 2 d , define f j : X d → {0, 1} as f j (x) = 1 if x = j and f j (x) = 0 otherwise. Define the concept class
We can now construct a sanitizer for C by applying the generic construction of [7] separately for C L and for C R . Given a database S, this will result in two sanitized databases S L , S R , with which we can answer all queries in the class C -a query for c ∈ C L is answered using S L , and a query for f ∈ C R is answered using S R . The described (improper) sanitizer for C is of sample complexity O α,β,ǫ (log(X C ) + VC(C) log VC(C)).
Sanitization and Proper Private PAC
Similar techniques are used for both data sanitization and private learning, suggesting relationships between the two tasks. We now explore one such relationship in proving a lower bound on the sample complexity needed for sanitization (under pure differential privacy). In particular, we show a reduction from the task of private learning to the task of data sanitization, and then use a lower bound on private learners to derive a lower bound on data sanitization. A similar reduction was given by Gupta et al. [18] , where it is stated in terms of statistical queries. They showed that the existence of a sanitizer that accesses the database using at most k statistical queries, implies the existence of a learner that makes at most 2k statistical queries. We complement their proof and add the necessary details in order to show that the existence of an arbitrary sanitizer (that is not restricted to access its data via statistical queries) implies the existence of a private learner.
Notation. We will refer to an element of X d+1 as x • y, where x ∈ X d , and y ∈ {0, 1}.
Sanitization Implies Proper PPAC
We show that sanitization of a class C implies private learning of C. Consider an input labeled sample
m , labeled by some concept c ∈ C. The key observation is that in order to privately output a good hypothesis it is suffices to first produce a sanitizationŜ of S (w.r.t. a slightly different concept class C label , to be defined) and then to output a hypothesis h ∈ C that minimizes the empirical error over the sanitized databaseŜ. To complete the proof we then show that sanitization for C implies sanitization for C label . In order for the chosen hypothesis h to have small generalization error (rather then just small empirical error), our input database S must contain at least
log( 1 αβ ) elements. We therefore start with the following simple (technical) lemma, handling a case where our initial sanitizer operates only on smaller databases. Proof. Fix q ∈ N and let A be an (α, β, ǫ, m)-sanitizer for a class C over a domain X. Note that by Theorem 2.21, there exists a (2α, Inputs: a database S = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z qm ) ∈ (X)
As A ′ is ǫ-differentially private, so is B. DenoteŜ = (ẑ 1 ,ẑ 1 , . . . ,ẑ qn ) ∈ (X) qn . Recall that q ≥ 18 β ln(1/β), and, hence, using the Chernoff bound, with probability at least (1 − β) it holds that at least (1 − 2β)q of thê S i 's are 2α-good for their matching S i 's. In such a caseŜ is (2α + 2β)-good for S: for every f ∈ C it holds that
As at least (1 − 2β)q of theŜ i 's are 2α-good for their matching S i 's, and as trivially Q f (S i ) ≤ 1 for each databaseŜ i that is not 2α-good,
Similar arguments show that Q f (S) ≥ Q f (Ŝ) − (2α + 2β). Algorithm B is, therefore, a ((2α + 2β), β, ǫ, qm)-sanitizer for C, as required.
As mentioned above, our first step in showing that sanitization for a class C implies private learning for C is to show that privately learning C is implied by sanitization for the slightly modified class C label , defined as follows. For a given predicate c over X d , we define the predicate c label over X d+1 as
Note that c label ( x • σ) = σ ⊕ c( x) for σ ∈ {0, 1}. For a given class of predicates C over X d , we define
Proof. For the first inequality notice that if a set S ⊆ X d is shuttered by C then the set S • 0 is shuttered by C label . For the second inequality, assume S ⊆ X d+1 is shattered by C label . Consider the partition of S to S 0 and S 1 , where S σ = { x • y ∈ S : y = σ}. For at least one σ ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that |S σ | ≥ |S| 2 . Hence, the setŜ = { x : x · σ ∈ S σ } is shattered by C and VC(C label ) ≤ 2 · |Ŝ| ≤ 2 · VC(C).
The next lemma shows that for every concept class C, a sanitizer for C label implies a private learner for C. In the next lemma, this connection is made under the assumption that the given sanitizer operates on large enough databases. This assumption will be removed in the lemma that follows. Proof. Let A be an (α, β, ǫ, m)-sanitizer, and consider the following algorithm Learn:
2. Output c ∈ C minimizing errorŜ(c).
As A is ǫ-differentially private, so is Learn. For the utility analysis, fix some target concept c t ∈ C and a distribution D over X d , and define the following two good events:
We first show that if these 2 good events happen, algorithm Learn returns a (2α + γ)-good hypothesis. As the target concept satisfies error S (c t ) = 0, event E 1 ensures the existence of a concept f ∈ C s.t. errorŜ(f ) ≤ α. Thus, algorithm Learn chooses a hypothesis h ∈ C s.t. errorŜ(h) ≤ α. Using event E 1 again, this h obeys error S (h) ≤ 2α. Therefore, event E 2 ensures that h satisfies error D (h, c t ) ≤ 2α + γ.
We will now show that these 2 events happen with high probability. By the definition of C label , for every c label ∈ C label we have that
Therefore, as A is an (α, β, ǫ, m)-sanitizer for C label , event E 1 happens with probability at least (1 − β). As m ≥ 50 VC(C) γ 2 ln( 1 γβ ), Theorem 2.14 ensures that event E 2 happens with probability at least (1 − β) as well. All in all, Learn is a proper ((2α + γ), 2β, ǫ, m)-PPAC learner for C.
The above lemma describes a reduction from the task of privately learning a concept class C to the sanitization task of the slightly different concept class C label . We next show that given a sanitizer for a class C, it is possible to construct a sanitizer for C label . Along the way we will also slightly increase the sample complexity of the starting sanitizer, in order to be able to use Lemma 5.3. This results in a reduction from the task of privately learning a concept class C to the sanitization task of the same concept class C.
Lemma 5.4. If there exists an (α, β, ǫ, m)-sanitizer for a class C, then there exists a ((5α + 4β), 5β, 6ǫ, t)-sanitizer for C label , where
Proof. Let A ′ be an (α, β, ǫ, m)-sanitizer for a class C. By replacing α with 2α, and β with 2β, we can assume that the sanitized databases returned by A ′ are always of fixed size n = O(
log( . By Lemma 5.1 for every qM (where q ∈ N) there exists a ((4α + 4β), 2β, ǫ, qM ) sanitizer A for C (as qM = q ′ m for an integer q ′ ). Denote t = 6 α 2 M , and consider algorithm B presented in Figure 12 Note that the output on Step 8 is just a post-processing of the 4 outputs on Step 7. We first show that each of those 4 outputs preserves differential privacy, and, hence, B is private (with slightly bigger privacy parameter, see Theorem 2.3).
By the properties of the laplacian mechanism,m 0 andm 1 each preserves ǫ-differential privacy. The analysis for S 0 and S 1 is symmetric, and we next give the analysis for S 0 . Denote by B 0 an algorithm identical to the first 7 steps of B, except that the only output of B 0 on Step 7 is S 0 . We now show that B 0 is private. 
. Algorithm B is, therefore, a (5α + 4β), 5β, 6ǫ, t)-sanitizer for C label , where + 12β) , 10β, 6ǫ, t)-PPAC learner for C. Remark 5.6. Given an efficient proper-sanitizer for C and assuming the existence of an efficient non-private learner for C, this reduction results in an efficient private learner for C.
A Lower Bound for k-POINT d
Next we prove a lower bound on the database size of every sanitizer for k-POINT d that preserves pure differential privacy.
Consider the following concept class over To see this, we could construct such a set using the following greedy algorithm. InitiateB = ∅, and C = k-POINT d \{c I ∈ k-POINT d : 0 d ∈ I}. While C = ∅, arbitrarily choose a concept c A ∈ C, add c A toB, and remove from C every concept c I s.t. |A ∩ I| ≤ k 2 . Clearly, for every two c A1 = c A2 ∈B it holds that |A 1 ∩ A 2 | ≤ k 2 . Moreover, at every step, the number of concepts that are removed from C is at most
and, therefore,B In the next lemma we will use the last lower bound on the sample complexity of private learners, together with the reduction of Theorem 5.5, and derive a lower bound on the database size necessary for pure private sanitizers for k-POINT d . 3. Let B = {b 1 , . . . , b ℓ } be the set of all the (unlabeled) points appearing at least once in S 1 .
4. For every (z 1 , . . . , z ℓ ) ∈ Π C (B), (a) Let c ∈ C be an arbitrary concept in C s.t. c(b i ) = z i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
(b) Add c to H.
5. Choose and return h ∈ H using the exponential mechanism with inputs ǫ, H, S 2 and the quality function q(S 2 , h) = |{i : h(x i ) = y i }|. Privacy. ∀S x ∈ X m , algorithm A(S x , ·) = A Sx (·) is ǫ-differentially private (as in Definition 2.2);
Utility. Algorithm A is an (α, β, m)-PAC learner for C (as in Definition 2.7).
Chaudhuri et al. [9] proved lower bounds on the sample complexity of label-private learners for a class C in terms of its doubling dimension. As we will now see, the correct measure for characterizing the sample complexity of such learners is the VC dimension, and the sample complexity of label-private learners is actually of the same order as that of non-private learners (assuming α, β, and ǫ are constants). In Figure 13 we describe a label-private algorithm A. Algorithm A constructs a set of hypotheses H as follows: It samples an unlabeled sample S 1 , and defines B as the set of points in S 1 . For every labeling of the points in B realized by C, add to H an arbitrary concept consistent with this labeling. Afterwards, algorithm A uses the exponential mechanism to choose a hypothesis out of H.
Note that steps 1-4 of algorithm A are independent of the labeling vector S y . By the properties of the exponential mechanism (which is used to access S y on Step 5), for every set of elements S x , algorithm A(S x , ·) is ǫ-differentially private.
For the utility analysis, fix a target concept c ∈ C and a distribution D over X, and define the following 3 good events:
The constructed set H contains at least one hypothesis f s.t. error S 2 (f ) ≤ α 4 . E 2 For every h ∈ H s.t. error S 2 (h) ≤ α 2 , it holds that error D (c, h) ≤ α. E 3 The exponential mechanism chooses an h such that error S 2 (h) ≤ α 4 + min f ∈H {error S 2 (f )}. We first show that if these 3 good events happen, then algorithm A returns an α-good hypothesis. Event E 1 ensures the existence of a hypothesis f ∈ H s.t. error S 2 (f ) ≤ α 4 . Thus, event E 1 ∩ E 3 ensures algorithm A chooses (using the exponential mechanism) a hypothesis h ∈ H s.t. error S 2 (h) ≤ α 2 . Event E 2 ensures, therefore, that this h obeys error D (c, h) ≤ α.
We will now show that those 3 events happen with high probability. For every (y 1 , . . . , y ℓ ) ∈ Π C (B), algorithm A adds to H a hypothesis f s.t. ∀1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, f (b i ) = y i . In particular, H contains a hypothesis h * s.t. h * (x) = c(x) for every x ∈ B. That is, a hypothesis h * s.t. error S 1 (h * ) = 0. Therefore, by setting n ≥ ). In such a case, using the Chernoff bound, we get that with probability at least 1 − exp(−(m − n)α/24) this hypothesis h * satisfies error S 2 (h * ) ≤ is less than exp(−(m − n)α/8). As |H| = 2 |B| ≤ 2 n , the probability that there is such a hypothesis in H is at most 2 n · exp(−(m − n)α/8). For m ≥ 8 α (n + ln( 4 β )), this probability is at most β 4 , and event E 2 happens with probability at least (1 − β 4 ). The exponential mechanism ensures that the probability of event E 3 is at least 1 − |H| · exp(−ǫαm/8) (see Proposition 2.25), which is at least (1 − 
), we ensure that the probability of A failing to output an α-good hypothesis is at most β.
Label Privacy Extension
We consider a slight generalization of the label privacy model. Recall that given a labeled sample, a private learner is required to preserve the privacy of the entire sample, while a label-private learner is only required to preserve privacy for the labels of each entry.
Consider a scenario where there is no need in preserving the privacy of the distribution D (for example, D might be publicly known), but we still want to preserve the privacy of the entire sample S. We can model this scenario as a learning algorithm A which is given as input 2 databases -a labeled database S, and an unlabeled database D. For every database D, algorithm A(D, ·) = A D (·) must preserve differential privacy. We will refer to such a learner as a Semi-Private learner.
Clearly, Ω(VC(C)) samples are necessary in order to semi-privately learn a concept class C, as this is the case for non-private learners.
5 This lower bound is tight, as the above generic learner could easily be adjusted for the semi-privacy model, and result in a generic semi-private learner with sample complexity O α,β,ǫ (VC(C)). To see this, recall that in the above algorithm, the input sample S is divided into S 1 and S 2 . Note that the labels in S 1 are ignored, and, hence, S 1 could be replaced with an unlabeled database. Moreover, note that S 2 is only accessed using the exponential mechanism (on Step 5), which preserves the privacy both for the labels and for the examples in S 2 .
Example 6.3. Consider the task of learning a concept class C, and suppose that the relevant distribution over the population is publicly known. Now, given a labeled database S, we can use a semi-private learner and guarantee privacy both for the labellings and for the mere existence of an individual in the database. That is, in such a case, the privacy guarantee of a semi-private learner is the same as that of a private learner. Moreover, the necessary sample complexity is O α,β,ǫ (VC(C)), which should be contrasted with O α,β,ǫ (log |C|) which is the sample complexity that would result from the general construction of Kasiviswanathan et al. [22] .
